Agricultural Market Structure, Generic Advertising, and Welfare by Cardon, James H. & Pope, Rulon D.
Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 28(2): 185-200 
Copyright 2003 Western Agricultural Economics Association 
Agricultural Market Structure, 
Generic Advertising, 
and Welfare 
James H. Cardon and Rulon D. Pope 
This analysis begins with a definition and discussion of productive advertising. Then, 
following Dixit and Norman, persuasive advertising is used to study the welfare 
effects of  generic advertising by marketing orders. The study first examines hori- 
zontal competition when the competing advertiser is a monopoly, and results show 
that the socially optimal level of  advertising for a competitive marketing order is 
positive only if advertising raises monopoly output. Next, advertising choices of  a 
marketing order which sells its output to a monopolistic distributor are considered. 
If the distributor is a monopolist, then marketing order advertising raises welfare. 
This finding is in marked contrast to the results for the horizontal case studied by 
Dixit and Norman. 
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Introduction 
Generic advertising has  been a common feature of agriculture for many decades. Presum- 
ably, interest in the United States heightened after the Great Depression as  effective 
ways to stimulate agricultural demand were sought (Forker). Early empirical work by 
Nerlove and Waugh concluded that advertising for oranges  had been an  effective strategy 
for the agricultural sector. Since then, a large number of empirical studies have con- 
sidered the effects of advertising on demand and production (e.g., Ward and Lambert; 
Wohlgenant). From the producer side, some of the specific issues related to advertising 
include: (a)  whether advertising levels maximize industry profit (e.g., Nerlove and 
Waugh), (b)  the distribution of benefits from advertising across firms  and products (e.g., 
Chung and Kaiser; Ward and Lambert; Kinnucan and Miao; Zhang and Sexton), and 
(c) the strategic effects of competition in advertising levels (e.g., Alston, Freebairn, and 
James). 
There is a much smaller body of research evaluating the welfare effects of advertising 
(e.g., Alston, Chalfant, and Piggott). One of several possible reasons for this paucity is 
the  difficulty of modeling what advertising is and  how it  affects utility, choice, and  hence 
welfare (Liu; Pope; Dixit and Norman 1980).  Advertising can be characterized in three 
principal ways: as  information, as  persuasion, or as  a complement in  consumption of the 
good. Each of these has clear implications for what surpluses enter into a welfare calcu- 
lation. All of these approaches seem likely to  yield relevant insights into how advertising 
should be evaluated (Bagwell). 
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Advertising as  pure persuasion has a long tradition in economics. The modern treat- 
ment of persuasive advertising is found in an influential article by Dixit and Norman 
(1978). In their model, advertising merely indexes tastes. Dixit and Norman allow for 
the welfare effects of advertising to be evaluated using either pre- or post-advertising 
tastes. However, advertising  has  no direct effect on welfare. Advertising changes tastes, 
but the  pre- and post-advertising preferences are not comparable, because, in effect, they 
represent two distinct individuals, and standard theory does not allow for interpersonal 
comparisons. All welfare effects are a result of the indirect effects of advertising on prices 
and quantities. 
In contrast, the informative view holds that advertising provides information about 
the existence, availability, or quality of a good, and must be treated differently (see von 
der  Fehr and Stevik).  Informative advertising has an  added potential for improving wel- 
fare by either informing consumers about the existence or characteristics of a good or 
by leading to lower prices. Studying a market in which advertising messages inform 
consumers about the existence of hs,  Butters found the equilibrium level of advertising 
is socially efficient. In contrast, Stahl  concluded the Nash equilibrium level of advertising 
in an oligopoly is less than socially optimal, since firms cannot capture the full benefit 
of  advertising when the output is homogeneous. 
Advertising that is fundamentally uninformative can also inform consumers about 
the quality of new or unfamiliar goods. This case is made by Milgrom and Roberts, who 
build on the  earlier concepts of Nelson. Advertising can signal high quality, because only 
high-quality goods will inspire the repeat purchases necessary to rationalize the  adver- 
tising expense. 
Finally, there is the complementary view in which advertising changes demand by 
acting as  a complement in  the consumption of the  advertised good. Advertising enhances 
consumption of the good, perhaps by adding to the prestige of being a consumer. In this 
case, a consumer possesses a stable set of  preferences, and advertising expenditures 
enter directly into the utility function as an  additional argument (see Stigler and Becker; 
Fisher and McGowan; Nichols; Becker and Murphy). This approach allows for standard 
welfare analysis. 
A lively and  instructive debate, which still  continues,  begins with Dixit and  Norman's 
original "Advertising and Welfare" article (1978). Shapiro's response argues for the 
informative view, while Fisher and McGowan's response argues for the complementary 
view. See also the rejoinders (Dixit and Norman 1979,1980).  Below, we demonstrate how 
competing views can be drawn together. In our view the issue is by no means resolved, 
and it  seems likely that  most advertising has  elements of each. After defining  productive 
advertising, it is shown that  when persuasive advertising  has social value, it will more 
generally have value when it is  productive. This approach allows us  to  focus on the search 
for cases when persuasive advertising has social value. 
This analysis considers two conceptual extensions of the  basic approach to determine 
if there is greater scope for welfare enhancement. First, when a marketing order is 
competing with a monopolist, might a second-best argument suggest that  optimal 
advertising be greater than zero? An application of this stylized model might apply, for 
example, to milk competing strategically with soft drinks. Thus, we consider two Nash- 
Cournot competitors in advertising: one that produces monopolistically in the output 
market, and an  industry which produces competitively. These competitors are  referred 
to here as  the monopolist and the marketing order, respectively. Cardon and Pope  Agricultural Market Structure, Generic Advertising, and Welfare  187 
A second extension considers a vertical structure with an upstream firm or industry 
(marketing order) and a downstream firm (processor or distributor). We examine the 
impact of distributor market power on the socially optimal level of advertising. Thus, 
the  first extension is  what might be called "horizontal competition," and the latter exten- 
sion is "vertical competition." 
Throughout, homogeneous firms are assumed, and therefore the possibility of impor- 
tant distributional effects is ignored (Chung and Kaiser). Dynamic entry and exit issues 
which clearly affect the private profitability of advertising in the long run are  not 
considered. Initially it is assumed marketing order advertising is financed using lump- 
sum taxes, adding a brief extension to ad valorem financing at the end of each section. 
This has the conceptual advantage of decoupling the effects-possible  benefits and 
distortions-of  taxation from those of advertising because the lump-sum tax is non- 
distortionary. 
We conclude that when a marketing order is horizontally competing with either 
another marketing order or a monopolist, advertising is not socially viable except in the 
monopoly case, when increased marketing order advertising raises the output of the 
monopolist. This may not be the most common case, but it does seem reasonable that, 
on occasion, generic advertising leads to an increase in a branded output. On the other 
hand, in a vertical structure, we find there is greater scope for socially welfare-enhancing 
advertising by a marketing order because of the downstream firm's market power. In 
this case, the level of advertising chosen by the marketing order is too low. Because the 
Dixit and Norman approach is generally thought to be biased against the social value 
of advertising,  these results provide ample scope for the social viability of generic adver- 
tising when advertising is also productive. 
Basic Notation, Strategy, and  Welfare 
The marketing order's problem occurs in two stages. In the first stage, the marketing 
order acts as agent for the firms in choosing the level of advertising which maximizes 
industry profits. The marketing order acts knowing that the firms will choose output 
independently. In the second stage, each firm chooses output taking prices as given. 
Assume there are  two markets for substitute  goods, in addition to the  numkraire good 
y, with inverse demand curves PI(&,,  Q,, A,, A,)  and P,(Q,,  Q,, A,, A,), where Q and  A 
are  market output and advertising, respectively. Let C,(Q,),  k = 1,2,  be the  industry cost 
function excluding advertising. The cost function of an individual representative com- 
petitive firm in industry k is denoted c,(q,).  Assume also that Ck(Qk)  and ck(q,),  k = 1,2, 
are strictly convex. 
Following Dixit and Norman, let consumer j's  demand be generated by the utility 
function: 
.  . 
UJ = yJ + u;(~{,  qi,A,,A,)  = YJ + uj(q~,  A). 
This is  the quasi-linear utility function,  which simplifies welfare analysis by eliminating 
income effects, thus rationalizing the use of consumer surplus as a welfare measure. 
Though likely not in the class of functions which globally describes the consumer 
behavior for food, this utility function does allow one to focus on other issues beyond 
income effects. Income IJ  is comprised of an endowment eJ  and a profit distribution IIJ. 188  August 2003  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Consumption of the  numeraire good is specified as yj  = Ij -  Xk pkq;l'.  Utility maximization 
subject to the budget constraint yields inverse and direct demand functions in vector 
form: 
(2)  P = u;(~J,  A)  and  q~  = g~(P,  A). 
Persuasive Advertising and Welfare 
The formulation of  Dixit and Norman suggests using either pre- or post-advertising 
preferences to evaluate welfare. Let Adenote the  advertising  standard at  which welfare 
is evaluated. Then the welfare function, given A, is written as: 
(3)  W(A; A) =  (uJ(~J(P,  A); A) - PgJ(P,  A)) 
J 
+ x  eJ + II,(P, A) + I12(P,  A). 
J 
The marginal effect of A,  on welfare is: 
a( II,  + 11,)  dP1  dP2 
-Q1-  - Q2-,  k = l,2. 
JAk  dAk  dAk 
If welfare is evaluated at post-advertising preferences (this is presumed, in the large, 
to be the most prejudiced toward the social desirability of advertising), then u;(qJ;  A)  = 
P for any A, and (4) becomes: 
Thus, the marginal effect of advertising on welfare consists of the impact on profits in 
the economy and an impact due to the effect on the consumer's  prices. Equation (5) 
makes clear at once the virtues and vices of  persuasive advertising. One prominent 
virtue is that everything is very measurable from standard surplus and profit function 
estimates. This is true regardless of  market structure. The main vice flows from the 
standard assumption underlying persuasive advertising. Advertising molds tastes: it 
does not inform or even entice the consumer in the sense that one would pay ex ante for 
more advertising. 
Productive Advertising and Welfare 
We define advertising to be productive for qJ if JUJIJA = JuJIJA > 0. That is, the utility 
function is stable over quantities of  goods and advertising and holding quantities of 
consumption fixed, and increased advertising increases utility or welfare. This may 
imply a goods-advertising indifference curve having the usual convexity properties. This 
property does not imply cardinality unless one attaches some quantitative meaning 
to JUJIJA. An example used by Dixit and Norman (and others) is similar to utility over Cardon and Pope  Agricultural Market Structure, Generic Advertising, and Welfare  189 
characteristics: i.e., z!  =xJ(~,  qJ) and uj  = uj(zi,  zi), where z!represents  the jth char- 
acteristic for the ith person. Thus, characteristics are produced by goods, and utility is 
defined over characteristics. 
This is an eminently reasonable and simple way to represent the impact of adver- 
tising on image creation when it shows popular people consuming or endorsing the 
product. However, to include information,  fi  should be viewed as  random and uj  should 
be thought of  as expected utility (Pope). Rather than commit to any particular formu- 
lation, we  merely write ~j(~j,  A), which suggests the essential feature of  productive 
advertising: advertising raises utility even when the quantity consumed remains 
constant. Hence, preferences occur over advertising as with any other good. 
In this case, it makes sense to calculate the effects of  possessing different levels of 
advertising  just as  it would to calculate Hicksian equivalent and compensating surplus 
for differing levels of any other good. Thus, it is appropriate to inquire about a consumer's 
willingness to pay for differing levels of advertising because there is stable preference 
map over (q,A)  bundles. Analogous to equation (3),  where ordinary surplus is appropri- 
ate, will be: 
W(A) = x  (u~(~'(P,  A); A)  - Pgj(P,  A)) 
J 
+ x  eJ + II1(P,  A) + n2(P,  A), 
J 
and the marginal effect of advertising in the kth industry on welfare is given as 
The first part of the bracketed term vanishes from optimization over q, leaving the 
envelope result analogous to (5): 
What is apparent from contrasting (6)-(8) with (3)-(5) is that productive advertising 
adds the additional term [square bracketed in (7) and (8)l. Note, like all envelope 
results, this term is a partial derivative evaluated at  the optimal level of qj  for all 
j = 1, ...,  N, but it arises from the fact that if qj  were constant, then changing advertising 
would change the level of utility. Also note, because it  is measured in utils, it is not 
directly measurable. One could in principle consider a willingness to pay for a given 
level of A, and calculate a compensating or equivalent surplus. This would have all the 
difficulties of  eliciting any public good's value. However, comparing (8)  with (5)  reveals 
the key contrasting effect: in productive advertising, a person is willing to pay ex ante 
for advertising ifauJlaA, is positive and prices are constant. For example, if the "got milk" 
slogan is productive, a person is willing to pay ex ante for the message (or campaign) 
"got milk" (perhaps celebrities producing or endorsing the slogan make this more reason- 
able). If one is not willing to pay ex ante for such an advertising message for any initial 
condition, then it seems the Dixit and Norman approach is the appropriate choice. 190  August 2003  Journal ofAgricultura1 and Resource Economics 
The term involving the productive effect of  advertising [Zj (aujlaAk)l  vitiates the 
conventional advantages of the quasi-linear utility function. It can be any magnitude, 
but is positive when advertising is productive. This term implies observable behavior 
does not generally measure welfare even in the quasi-linear case, even approximately. 
Hence, some form of compensating or equivalent variation should be used to measure 
welfare. These measures will depend on the form of  the indirect utility function (or, 
equivalently, the expenditure function). For these reasons, in this study, the following 
strategy is adopted: the term [Zj (aujlaAk)l  is ignored, and we consider cases in which 
persuasive advertising might increase welfare. From (8),  if welfare is increased in the 
persuasive case, then a fortiori welfare will increase when advertising is productive. 
Persuasive Advertising and  Horizontal Market Structure 
Initially, to create a benchmark from which to  judge other structures, we assume indus- 
tries 1  and 2 are  both competing marketing orders, such that Pk = CL(Qk  ), k = 1,2,  for any 
level of A = (A,, A,).  The marginal impacts on profits are denoted by: 
Inserting the results from (9) into (5)  yields: 
Note, expression (10)  was obtained by assuming only that consumers maximize utility 
subject to their budget constraint and competitive firms maximize profit by choosing 
output. Thus, a marginal increase in advertising by either industry reduces welfare. 
This conclusion holds for all values of A. Hence, as expected, the socially desirable level 
of  advertising is zero (Cardon and Pope). 
Consider now the case where industries are assumed to maximize with respect to 
advertising. Assume advertising and output decisions are  made in two stages, with 
advertising occurring  first. Second-stage  output decisions are  made by independent firms 
to maximize firm profits, taking prices and first-stage advertising choices as  given. This 
leads to 
for the industry and, for the  firms, Pk = ci(q),  k = 1,2.  Solving  yields the  optimal industry 
output &,(A), k = 1,2.  In  the  first stage, by backward induction, each industry solves for 
Nash-Cournot levels of advertising using first-order conditions:' 
'  Second-order  conditions at the optimal output include that a(QkdPkldAk  - l)/aAk  < 0. Second-order  conditions are satisfied 
if, marginally, outputs and prices respond positively to increased advertising and there is a diminishing  marginal effect of 
advertising on price. Cardon and Pope  Agricultural Market Structure, Generic  Advertising, and Welfare  19 1 
Given marginal cost pricing, (12) reduces so that each marketing order solves 
For each industry, the best reply is A;(A_,),  k  = 1,2, where A-k  is the advertising 
level of  the other industry. Assume each industry's profit function is concave in own- 
advertising such that a unique Nash-Cournot equilibrium is obtained. Since each firm 
maximizes I&  over A,,  the direct marginal effect of advertising on firm or industry profit 
is zero, or a&/dAk = 0, k  = 1,2. Inserting the cross-profit marginal effect from (9)  into (51, 
it follows that WAk  = -QKdPk/dAk  = -1, k  = 1,2.  Thus advertising  is socially excessive at  the 
private optimum. 
This model serves as a useful backdrop from which to expand consideration to two 
main cases which form the core of  our analysis. First, we inquire whether providing for 
one of  the industries to be a monopolist gives greater rationale for society to sanction 
advertising of otherwise competitive  products. Throughout,  the first firm is the monopo- 
list and the second is the competitive industry with a marketing order. 
Our goal in this section is to use the model of  changing tastes, developed by Dixit and 
Norman, in order to determine whether a second-best argument implies greater scope 
for the social viability of  advertising by a marketing order. Because firms are presumed 
to choose outputs to maximize profits while consumers maximize utility, it is necessary 
to first characterize  the monopolist's optimal output choice. As with the marketing order, 
we assume a monopolist chooses both output and advertising levels, and we solve the 
monopolist's problem sequentially. 
Begin with the second stage where advertising is considered fured. The monopolist 
chooses Q, to maximize profit: 
The familiar first-order condition is: 
where Ci denotes marginal cost. Solving (14) leads to the monopolist's optimal output 
Q;(Al,A2). In contrast, the competitive firms in market 2 choose their output indepen- 
dently so that for each firm P,  =  ci(q),  which implies an aggregate output &;(Al, A,)  con- 
sistent with P,(Q, A) = C;(Q;). 
Moving to the first stage, the monopolist and marketing order have respective profits 
of 
DIMl, 44,)  = PI(&;, Q,*)Q; - Cl(Q;) -  A1 
and 
n2(A1,  A,)  = P2(Q;, &,'I&,'  - C2(Q,')  -  A,. 
These lead to the following marginal effects: 192  August 2003  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
In turn, these marginal effects are simplified using (14) and assuming marginal cost 
pricing in market 2: 
Assume II, and 11,  are respectively concave in A, and A,, such that a unique Nash 
equilibrium in advertising levels exists. Given this assumption, the monopolist optimizes 
overA, by setting (19) equal to zero, while the marketing order does the same with (22). 
The unique Nash equilibrium is the simultaneous solution of these two first-order condi- 
tions. Note the difference between total and partial derivatives of price with respect to 
advertising. 
To evaluate  the  welfare effects of advertising, use (5)  and impose the  new monopolist/ 
competitive marketing order structures. For the marketing order, use the expressions 
from (16) and (18) to obtain: 
Hence, the social desirability of advertising  hinges crucially on the output levels chosen 
by the  monopolist and the  marketing order. If it is assumed each competitor is choosing 
the profit-maximizing level of output, then the first term vanishes, leaving:, 
Equation (24)  can be written as WA2  =  - 1, where the E'S  denote elasticities. For example, EQ,~,  is the 
price elasticity for the monopolist. Cardon and Pope  Agricultural Market Structure, Generic Advertising, and Welfare  193 
  valuation of this derivative requires signing the bracketed term. If the monopolist's 
demand curve is downward sloping, and if increasing the marketing order's advertising 
reduces the monopolist's output, then the bracketed term is positive. Thus, WA,< 0 for 
all values ofA, and  A,.  This result occurs because if the monopolist is maximizing profit 
by choosing output, it is already producing lower than the socially desirable output, and 
advertising by the marketing order exacerbates this condition. 
On the other hand, if the marketing order increases the monopolist's output, then 
clearly there is room for the social desirability of  generic advertising. For example, if 
generic advertising raises the output for a branded alternative in the same industry, 
then the bracketed term in (24)  is negative and the marginal social benefit (MSB) of 
advertising is positive. When MSB > 1  for some level of  advertising, there is scope for 
the social desirability of advertising by the marketing order-because  generic advertising 
raises the monopolist's output, thus providing a benefit to society. 
The above results are summarized in the following proposition. 
PROPOSITION  1. Assume that advertising ispersuasive, and let welfare be evaluated 
at post-advertising preferences. Given consumer utility maximization and profit- 
maximizing outputs: (a)  the socially optimal level of advertising by the marketing 
order is zero if increased advertising marginally reduces the level of output by the 
monopolist, and (b)  the socially optimal level of advertising by the marketing order 
may be positive if  increased advertising marginally increases the level of output 
produced  by the monopolist. That is, dQ;laA2 > 0 is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for the social desirability of advertising by the marketing order. 
It is apparent, in the Dixit and Norman framework, that advertising generally does 
not represent aggregate demand enhancement,  but represents transfers from consumers 
to producers. The exception is when the socially incorrect level of the good is being pro- 
duced and price exceeds marginal cost. In this second-best case advertising can, in some 
situations, lead to increased monopolistic output, and hence improved social welfare. 
The results above cannot change substantively when advertising is evaluated at  the 
profit-maximizing levels. In this case, dII,/aA,  = 0. Consequently, using (5)  and (201, 
aQ1  w,,  = [P, - c;] -  - 
aA2 
Note, at the profit-maximizing level of advertising by the marketing order, Q;(dP,ldA,) 
= 1. If generic advertising raises own-price and lowers the quantity sold by the monopo- 
list, then WA2<  0.  Thus, at  the profit-maximizing level of advertising, it follows that the 
generic advertising  is socially excessive whenever generic advertising lowers the monop- 
olist's output. If, on the other hand, advertising by the marketing order raises the 
monopolist's output, then additional generic advertising may raise social welfare. When 
advertising is productive, it can be socially beneficial even when increased advertising 
by the marketing order decreases the output of  the monopoly. 194  August 2003  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
In  this section it  was discovered that persuasive advertising  by a marketing  order can 
be socially beneficial only if it increases the monopolist's output. The key factor is the 
presence of a markup over marginal cost. We next determine  whether significant altera- 
tions to these conclusions occur if ad valorem taxes (the check-off)  are collected to pay 
for the advertising. 
Adding Ad Valorem Financing 
Consider the case of an ad valorem industry tax which is  used to directly finance adver- 
tising in the marketing order. Let t be the tax or check-off rate. In keeping with most 
literature on taxation, we consider an ad valorem formulation. Specific  taxes or assess- 
ments can always be converted to ad valorem equivalents. Hence, letting P,d be the 
demand price, P," = (1  -  t)~:  is  the supply price. The marketing order chooses advertising 
to maximize industry profits, and the  tax rate t adjusts to cover the expense. The market- 
ing order's profit when market 1  is a monopolist is given by: 
II,  = (1 - t)p,d(Q1, Q2,A1,A2)Q2 - Cz(Qz), 
where t =A,  lP,dQ,.  Ignore any administrative costs and promotion or research activities 
other than advertising. The optimal quantity produced by the marketing order solves 
and that for the monopolist in market 1  solves 
Solving yields the respective optimal quantities, &;(A,,A,)  and Q,*(A,,A,). 
The marketing order's solution for the optimal level of  advertising, and hence its 
optimal tax rate t, is characterized by 
and, using (26), 
(29) 
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and EQ~,~  and E~~~~ are, respectively, the elasticities of  output and price with respect to 
advertising. Holding price and output constant, an increase in advertising requires a 
higher tax  rate. However, advertising also raises revenue for a given tax  rate, and so the 
total effect is ambiguous. (It is clear dtldA, > 0 near t = 0.) 
Using (5), (16), and (28), the marginal effect of  advertising on social welfare is: 
where t' = PlQlIA2. 
Two alternative representations of (30) are also useful: 
The first term is a marginal external or cross-effect (cost or benefit) of advertising; the 
second bracketed term is the net marginal benefit of advertising. Suppose the external 
advertising effect is negative: aQ;laA2 c 0. Because the markup term is positive, a neces- 
sary condition for WA2  = 0 for some A,  > 0 is that the term EQ~A~  - 1  be positiv+i.e.,  the 
supply price rise is larger than the demand price rise (in absolute value).  Alternatively, 
if  the external advertising effect is positive and there is an inelastic own-quantity 
response to advertising (&QzA2 - 1  c 0),  then advertising by the marketing order is socially 
beneficial. 
Given that advertising raises own-price and dtldA,  0, then a necessary condition 
for any positive level of advertising to be welfare improving is aQ;laA2> 0, as noted in 
proposition 1. As intuition suggests, if a wedge is placed between demand and supply 
prices, there will be an  additional loss due  to this distortion [compare  (25) and (30)l. The 
only possibility for welfare to be enhanced with additional advertising  when aQ;laA2 s 0 
is if advertising has a large marginal impact such that dtldA, > 0. 
If some positive level of persuasive advertising is socially beneficial, it is instructive 
to ask  whether the  profit-maximizing level is the socially  optimal level. Inserting expres- 
sions for dII,ldA2 and dI121dA2 into (5) yields: 
The second term is clearly negative, and the first is negative ifthere are cross-advertising 
effects such that EQ~A,  c 0. In  this case, advertising  is socially excessive. However, as  noted 
in proposition 1, advertising could be socially optimal if the cross-effects were positive. 
This is the necessary condition for the maximization of social welfare. 
Summarizing  this section, little changes qualitatively with the  change from lump-sum 
to ad valorem financing in terms of marginal welfare effects. Taxes add a distortion to 196  August 2003  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
the  market. Marginally, this distortion may fall as advertising increases. Clearly, it  does 
affect the  profit-maximizing  level of advertising  as  well as  the quantitative welfare 
calculations. 
Next, we consider another leading case in which a downstream processor or distributor 
has market power. This case is generally thought to be applicable to agricultural mar- 
kets. Whether monopsonistic  or monopolistic, generally too little is produced and  generic 
advertising may help increase demand and increase welfare. 
Generic Advertising in a Vertical Relationship 
The case of horizontal Nash-Cournot competition was considered in the  previous section. 
Here, we examine the welfare effects of advertising in a vertical structure. There are 
two firms: an  upstream producer, and a downstream processor or distributor. Call the 
downstream firm the  distributor. The upstream industry is a marketing  order producing 
competitively with many independent firms, while the  downstream firm is a monopolist. 
Advertising is chosen by a marketing order, which is  just an  organization to coordinate 
joint advertising and it is assumed to have no control over output decisions. In the 
first "stage," the marketing order chooses advertising level, A. It does so anticipating 
(rationally)  the following: (a)  the distributor will choose output (or price) in a way that 
maximizes the distributor's profits, and (b)  each independent member of the marketing 
order will produce at  marginal cost. 
Zhang and Sexton analyze a similar case. They use a conjectural variations model to 
parameterize the distributor's market power as a buyer (monopsony) and as a seller 
(monopoly).  Results from simulations suggest both types of market power reduce both 
profits and advertising expenditures of the marketing order. Zhang and Sexton do not, 
however, consider the implications of market power for social welfare. 
For simplicity, assume a single downstream distributor with both monopsony and 
monopoly power. Let Pd(Q,  A) be market demand, with Pd  the price received by the 
distributor, and assume ~gd  c 0 and ~,d  > 0. Let Pu  be the price the distributor pays an 
upstream firm for each unit, and let C(Q) be upstream industry cost, so that C'(Q) is 
upstream supply. Since the upstream industry is competitive, Pu(Q)  = Ct(Q),  which 
represents the supply of Q.  Note that advertising does not directly affect the inverse 
demand function upstream. Higher prices upstream are obtained only by increasing 
production and moving up the supply curve of the marketing order. Given this behavior, 
the downstream firm's profits are represented by: 
Though this is a simple representation of the distributor's profit, more general models 
do not yield additional insights. The model in (33)  yields the familiar first-order con- 
dition: 
MCd 
where MCd is the marginal factor cost to the downstream firm. Rewrite (34) as: Cardon and Pope  Agricultural Market Structure, Generic Advertising, and Welfare  197 
The solution to (35) represents the quantity purchased by the distributor and resold in 
the market. 
Now consider the marketing order's advertising choice. Industry profits are denoted 
by: 
nu  = PUQ  - C(Q) -A. 
The first-order condition, using Pu  = C1(Q),  is: 
The downstream fhn  does not choose advertising, but the effect ofA on profit is specified 
as: 
Note that dPuldA  = (aPuIaQ)Q1(A)  = CU(Q)Q'(A). 
Assuming, as before, that preferences are evaluated at post-advertising levels, 
Evaluating at  the level of advertising chosen by the marketing order yields dIIuldA  = 0, 
and so 
Assuming a downward-sloping final market demand and a positive marginal response 
to advertising, this derivative will be positive, implying the marketing order's level of 
advertising is too low. 
PROPOSITION  2. Let  welfare be  evaluated at post-advertising preferences  and the 
profit-maximizing levels of  output and advertising, final  demands be  downward 
sloping, and let output respond positively to advertising (&'(A)  > 0). Then generic 
persuasive advertising should be expanded in order to maximize social welfare. 
The conclusion of proposition 2 is striking in terms of the usual negative results 
of persuasive advertising: advertising is  excessive. Here, the  profit-maximizing level 198  August 2003  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
of advertising  by the marketing order is not socially excessive, but is too low. This 
result can be stated more sharply and generally by altering the assumed behavioral 
response. 
Consider the socially optimal amount of advertising. Using (39) and dIIdldA and 
dIIuldA,  the marginal effect of advertising on social welfare is: 
Thus, presuming [Pd  -PulQ1(A)  > 1  for small  values ofA, the social optimum, given profit- 
maximizing outputs,  will involve positive amounts of ad~ertising.~  Another way to state 
the  result is: if it  pays privately for the  marketing order to advertise, then it  follows that 
the socially optimal quantity of advertising  is  greater than zero. This result follows from 
the fact that WA  = d IIUIdA  - Q(aPdIaQ)Q1(A)  > 0  when IIu  is increasing in advertising. 
Proposition 3 states this result. 
PROPOSITION  3. Let welfare be  evaluated at  post-advertising preferences and the 
profit-maximizing levels of  output. If market conditions are such that advertising 
would be profitable to the marketing order, then the socially optimal level of  adver- 
tising is positive. 
The reason advertising has social value here is that the monopolist is producing too 
little and yet is  free-riding off of the  marketing order's advertising. The marginal social 
benefit of the advertising is  the  marketing margin times the  change in output due to the 
advertising. The marginal social cost of advertising is 1. 
Adding Ad Valorem Financing 
We conclude by extending the  upstream-downstream analysis  to include ad valorem 
financing. As earlier, the tax rate, t, is assumed to be equal toAIPuQ.  Starting  with the 
case where the marketing order chooses advertising and output levels to maximize 
profit, it immediately follows that the expression for the marginal effect of advertising 
on social welfare is identical to (34). This is because the consumer effect just involves 
final price Pd,  the  marginal effect of advertising  on the  upstream firm is zero by assump- 
tion, and the impact on the  downstream firm is as described earlier. Hence, proposition 
2 still holds with lump-sum or ad valorem financing. 
The more interesting and complex case is when profit-maximizing output choices 
are  assumed,  but not necessarily profit-maximizing advertising  levels. Using (39) and 
expressions for dIIuldA and dIIdldA gives: 
Note that when the upstream industry or the marketing order chooses the level of advertising to maximize profit, 
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The first term in (41) is unambiguously positive if advertising increases output (given 
downward-sloping demand). It measures the net marginal benefit (spillover effect) of 
advertising to the downstream  firm. The second two terms give the net effect (net of con- 
sumers)  of advertising  on the upstream firm. Advertising raises revenue if price increases, 
but only by a factor of  (1  -  t),  due to the taxes. However, increased advertising may lead 
to increased taxes. Additional advertising  must raise the tax rate, t;  if the marginal effect 
of advertising raises the downstream  firm's revenue by less than (more than) (llt),  then 
dtldA > (<) 0 [see (32)l.  If dtldA < 0, implying advertising has a large marginal effect on 
the upstream firm's revenue, then W,  > 0, and the socially optimal quantity of  advertising 
is positive. 
Conclusion 
In the long run,  with entry and exit both domestically and abroad, the potential of  adver- 
tising to increase industry profits raises many questions, particularly under constant 
long-run industry marginal cost. However, we take for granted that in the short run, 
advertising  by a marketing order might be profit maximizing or at  least profit improving. 
Because of  the unique and controversial nature of  advertising, it does not follow that 
advertising is socially desirable or that the profit-maximizing advertising  level is socially 
optimal. Indeed, under the persuasive case and horizontal competition,  the socially opti- 
mal level of  persuasive advertising is zero. 
Using this as a backdrop and applying the approach of  persuasive advertising to the 
case where a competitive industry (agricultural marketing order) competes with a 
monopoly, generic advertising tends to move resources toward the monopolized good, 
and thus may be socially beneficial. This conclusion is true even when the monopolist 
and the marketing orders compete on advertising in the usual Nash-Cournot sense. In 
proposition 1, it is shown that advertising may be socially beneficial even if purely per- 
suasive when increased marketing order advertising leads to an increase in the output 
of  the monopolist. 
In the upstream-downstream case, a marketing order's output is an input to a pro- 
cessor or distributor which has market power. In this case, the monopolist is producing 
too little output, thereby directly affecting both the price and quantity sold by the 
competitive agricultural industry (marketing order). We  show in this case (proposition 
2) that the profit-maximizing level of  persuasive advertising by the marketing order is 
too small from a social welfare point of  view. This result is extended to a character- 
ization of  the social welfare optimum, which of  course implies advertising has social 
value and should be encouraged (proposition  3).  Thus, a strong case is developed for the 
social benefit of  advertising regardless of  one's view of  what advertising is. The results 
are essentially unchanged when funding is switched from lump sum to ad valorem. The 
optimal tax or other incentive structure to enable the social optimum to be achieved is 
left for future research. 
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